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Abstract
High inequality goes hand in hand with low intergenerational earnings mobil-
ity across countries. Little is known about why the US is characterized by high
inequality and low mobility, while the opposite tends to hold for Scandinavian
countries. In an overlapping generations model, calibrated to the US, education
policies are endogenized via probabilistic voting. By exploiting cross-country
variation in the bias in voter turnout towards the educated and elderly, the model
replicates the negative relation between inequality and public education expen-
ditures and accounts for more than a quarter of the variation in inequality and
mobility. For the US, I find that compulsory voting could foster mobility, whereas
inequality would be hardly affected.
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1. Introduction
Ever since the presidential address by Alan Krueger in 2012, the empirical
finding of a positive correlation between earnings inequality and intergenerational
earnings persistence has gained international fame as the “Great Gatsby Curve”.1
This paper investigates a political explanation for why countries are located at dif-
ferent points along the curve. Why does the US appear at one end of the curve,
exhibiting high inequality and high persistence, while most Scandinavian coun-
tries are characterized by low inequality and low persistence? More specifically,
I study whether variation in voter turnout rates - and the associated differences
in public education programs - can explain cross-country variation in intergen-
erational persistence and inequality. A model is specified, which allows me to
quantify the contribution of differences in voter turnout by age and education, and
moreover permits the simulation of counterfactual voting policies.
The paper can be summarized in terms of two findings: first, exploiting the
skewness of voter turnout by age and education, the model can consistently re-
produce patterns of intergenerational mobility observed across countries; second,
policies of compulsory voting or extending the electoral franchise to children by
letting their parents vote for them could foster mobility in the US.
Education is a strong determinant of earnings, and public provision of edu-
cation may enhance earnings mobility by raising the education level of the poor.
According to traditional voting models, the provision of public education, in par-
ticular non-tertiary education, is expected to be higher when the share of earnings
held by the rich is greater. However, the share of GDP dedicated to non-tertiary or
tertiary public education is negatively associated with inequality across countries,
as shown in Figure 2 in Section 2. This could occur if the affluent prefer private
education and public policies are biased in their favor. Indeed, private education
expenditures are found to be positively associated with inequality across coun-
tries. Under the assumption that the rich prefer private education, this could be
driven by a bias in voter turnout.2
The quantitative model consists of two building blocks, namely an economic
and a political part. First, the economic part adopts a structure resembling that
1The name was adopted from the novel “The Great Gatsby”, in which the author F. Scott
Fitzgerald challenges the “American Dream” by telling the story of Jay Gatsby, who rises to the
high society via shady deals.
2Surveys indicate that preferences for more public education are negatively related to income
(e.g., Busemeyer 2012).
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of Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). Parents invest in early private education, a sub-
stitute to public education, to enhance the imperfectly-inherited ability of their
offspring. Subsequently, households decide whether or not to send children to
college, where the more able students are less likely to drop out. Human capi-
tal formation is characterized by the dynamic complementarity between early and
late investments (e.g., Cunha and Heckman 2008, Cunha et al. 2010, Caucutt and
Lochner 2012).3 I add savings and retirement to Restuccia and Urrutia (2004),
whereby individuals consume their savings and a public pension during retire-
ment. Second, in the political part of the model, I let households vote on public
education, the replacement rate, and a lump-sum redistributive payment. Thus,
early public education expenditures and the slope of the college subsidy relative
to parental earnings are determined endogenously.
In the model economy, public education expenditures are endogenous and
households vote via probabilistic voting. Households vote in their own interest
and without altruistic preferences for society as a whole. Probabilistic voting al-
lows me to exploit the skewness of voter turnout by age and level of education
across countries in order to explain variations in education expenditures and the
effects on inequality and mobility. When modeling the political economy, De la
Croix and Doepke (2009) and Ichino et al. (2011) emphasize the importance of
the responsiveness of politicians to low-income families in the determination of
education funding. The voting channel embedded in my model provides a ratio-
nale, namely political participation, as to why we might observe differences in the
responsiveness across countries. The weights of individuals in the voting process
are assigned according to voter turnout by age group and level of education using
the voting supplement of the Current Population Survey (CPS) of 2006 for the US.
For the experiments, I use the 2010 European Social Survey and the 2008 Cana-
dian Election Study. I find that observed patterns of public and private education
expenditures, inequality, and intergenerational mobility can be reconciled by voter
3I use the expression “non-tertiary” or “early” to summarize primary and secondary education.
Given the evidence on the early formation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills (e.g., Cunha et al.
2006), the consideration of pre-primary education is an important factor in the examined dynamics
and outcomes from which I abstract. Peer and neighborhood effects, as well as health, are other
channels through which parental income could affect the learning aptitude of children that are
worth mentioning, but are not included in the model. Also, parental connections could contribute
to the intergenerational linkage of earnings. Corak and Piraino (2011) find that about 40% of
young Canadian men have worked for an employer who had previously employed their father at
some point in time, while 6-9% have the same employer in adulthood. The percentage increases
with paternal earnings.
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turnout. The counterfactual experiment accounts for 27% of the variation in inter-
generational mobility and 31% of the variation in the Gini index. As a robustness
check, I repeat the analysis, but instead weight voters by the fraction of political
party members per age group and education level. The data is obtained from the
World Values Survey 1981-2007 (WVS) and the results exhibit similar patterns.
This indicates that the political participation of a society, whether through vot-
ing or party membership, shapes public policy, thereby influencing inequality and
intergenerational mobility.
Given that patterns of voter turnout perform well in explaining cross-country
differences, I consider a range of possible voting policies for the US. One studied
policy is the enforcement of compulsory voting. The possible effects of compul-
sory voting on inequality have been studied by Chong and Olivera (2008), who,
in a cross-country analysis, find that compulsory voting is associated with a more
equal income distribution. In another experiment, I allow parents to vote on be-
half of their children. I find that the earnings persistence is reduced by 17% under
compulsory voting, whereas the extension of the electoral franchise to children
as of birth reduces earnings persistence by one quarter. However, the equalizing
effect of these policies on pre-tax earnings is comparably low. Additional policies
considered are lowering the voting age from 18 to 16 and using a proportional
instead of lump-sum education subsidy.
My paper contributes to the literature building on Becker and Tomes (1979,
1986) and Loury (1981), who pioneered the microfoundation of the three fun-
damental institutions in the determination of a child’s future: the family, the la-
bor market, and the state. The papers that build on these frameworks and are
most closely related to my approach are Restuccia and Urrutia (2004), Herring-
ton (2015), and Holter (2015), who use dynastic overlapping generations models
to quantitatively study intergenerational mobility. Assuming exogenous taxation
and education policies, Restuccia and Urrutia (2004) find that increasing early ed-
ucation expenditures would be more efficient than increasing college subsidies in
reducing intergenerational persistence. Herrington (2015) accounts for a share of
the gap in inequality and intergenerational persistence between Norway and the
US through variations in the allocation of public spending and revenue sources.
Holter (2015) exploits cross-country differences in the progressivity of income
taxation to explain part of the gap in intergenerational mobility between the US
and ten OECD countries. However, in all of the previously mentioned approaches,
public education expenditures are taken to be exogenous. This inevitably leads to
the question of the political economy of policies. My approach sheds light on a
driver of cross-country differences in tax and education policies, and allows me to
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conduct counterfactual simulations that provide insights into the effects of voting
policies on inequality and intergenerational mobility.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Motivating stylized facts
are presented in Section 2. The model is explained in Section 3 with the equi-
librium definition following in Section 4. The parameterization is described in
Section 5, while Section 6 gives the benchmark results and discusses policy ex-
periments for the US. In Section 7, experiments explain differences between the
US benchmark economy and other OECD countries. The robustness of these re-
sults is analyzed in Section 8. Finally, Section 9 concludes.
2. Stylized facts
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Figure 1: The Great Gatsby Curve
Sources: Gini from OECD (2013a); IEE from Corak (2013a).
Notes: The figure displays inequality measured by the Gini coefficient (x-axis) versus intergen-
erational earnings persistence in terms of the IEE (y-axis). The fitted line and the correlation
coefficient are computed excluding the outliers, Chile and Switzerland.
Figure 1 shows that inequality in terms of the Gini coefficient of individual
earnings before taxes and transfers and the intergenerational earnings elasticity
(IEE) exhibit a strong positive correlation across countries. The IEE is the coef-
ficient obtained by regressing the log of a son’s earnings on the log of paternal
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earnings, and captures the percentage change in a son’s adulthood earnings that is
associated with a one percentage point increase in paternal earnings.4
Figure 2 presents stylized evidence across countries that redistributive expen-
ditures in terms of public education do not match the predictions of a standard
median voter framework. The top panels show how inequality is negatively asso-
ciated with the share of GDP spent on public education. This relationship holds
for both non-tertiary (left panel) and tertiary (right panel) public education across
countries. The most unequal countries, such as Chile, Italy, and Mexico, tend to
spend less on both early and late public education. At the same time, more equal
countries, such as Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, are amongst the top spenders
at both stages. The bottom panels show that the opposite holds for private expen-
ditures, i.e. household expenditures are positively related to inequality, indicating
that in countries where inequality is higher, education might depend more on the
unequally-distributed parental earnings.
Through the channel of differential political participation, the model intro-
duced in the following section reconciles both the traditional voting models’ pre-
diction of a positive relation between inequality and public education expenditures
within a country and the negative relationship observed in cross-country data.
3. The model
The model consists of two parts, namely the economic and the political de-
cisions. In the following sections, the economic decision framework is outlined
before I turn to the political decision framework in Section 3.5.
3.1. Economic decision framework
The overlapping generations model builds on Restuccia and Urrutia (2004). A
household makes economic decisions as a single unit, exists for three periods, and
is composed of either young parents and young children (young household), old
parents and old children (old household), or retired parents (retired household). In
the subsequent period, retired parents die, while the old children become young
parents and form households of their own. Consequently, everybody lives for five
4The IEE is computed by averaging the earnings of fathers and sons over as many years as are
available in panel data in order to reduce measurement error and attrition bias through transitory
earnings shocks. As the paper focuses on education, both the Gini and the IEE are based on labor
earnings before taxes and transfers, i.e. returns to human capital.
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Figure 2: Inequality versus public and private education expenditures
Data sources: Gini from OECD (2013a); education expenditures from OECD (2011).
Notes: The figure displays inequality (Gini before taxes and transfers) on the x-axis versus edu-
cation expenditures (in terms of % of GDP) on the y-axis. The top panels display public and the
bottom panels private (i.e. household) education expenditures. The left and right panels refer to
non-tertiary and tertiary education expenditures, respectively.
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periods, but only makes economic decisions during the last three periods. Popu-
lation growth is zero and all parents have the same number of children, i.e. each
household has two identical children.5 Parents make education decisions for their
children and households are heterogeneous in the levels of innate ability of the
offspring, human capital of the parents, and accumulated physical assets. Life-
time utility is derived from consumption as a young household cy, old household
co, retired household cr, and altruism regarding the level of human capital a child
is left behind with. Consumption is pooled at the household level and is subject to
congestion. The utility function for consumption u(c) is increasing and concave.
Labor is provided inelastically and human capital is remunerated by competitive
firms at a wage rate w. Retired households consume their savings k, which are
subject to a risk-free exogenous interest rate r, as well as a public pension p,
which is a fraction of previous earnings.
3.2. Ability and human capital
Children’s innate ability is assumed to be correlated with parental innate abil-
ity. Innate ability is not altered over the lifecycle and can be interpreted as the
genetic component. Acquired ability aˆ is a function of innate ability and public
and private education investments when young, which later affect the probability
of college completion and wages. When a child is old, acquired ability aˆ trans-
forms into human capital hc. After becoming a parent, human capital evolves
exogenously, while capturing the lifecycle-earnings profile. When becoming a
young parent, human capital experiences a shock and converts to hy, whereas for
the old parent human capital is denoted by ho.
Innate ability a, when passed from one generation to the next, follows a first-
order discrete Markov process with mean normalized to one and transition matrix
Ψ. The vector of states for a and the elements in the transition matrix are restricted
such that the process is a discrete approximation of a continuous AR(1) process
as in
ln(a′) = ρln(a)+ ε where ε ∼ N(0,σ2a ). (1)
Innate ability a is transformed into acquired ability aˆ via public education g
and private early education e according to the function f (a,e,g) when the off-
5While De la Croix and Doepke (2004) demonstrate theoretically how differential fertility rates
might play a considerable role in the distribution of human capital investments and preferences for
public education among families, Bjo¨rklund et al. (2004) find no differences in intergenerational
mobility by family size using Norwegian data.
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spring is young. The function f (a,e,g) is assumed to be positive, strictly increas-
ing, and concave in all its arguments. Public and private education are treated as
perfect substitutes. Following the literature on early skill formation, acquired abil-
ity aˆ is increasing in innate ability a. Also the return to investment in education
is increasing in innate ability, such that ∂
2 f
∂a∂e ,
∂ 2 f
∂a∂g > 0, as skill has been found to
beget skill (Cunha et al. 2006, Cunha and Heckman 2008). The functional form
is assumed to be given by
aˆ = f (a,e,g) = δa1−γ(g+ e)γ . (2)
The curvature of f changes with the parameter γ , which is also responsible for
the relative importance of innate ability versus investment. The parameter δ is the
efficiency parameter regulating the level effect of human capital creation.
Everybody enjoys public education, while choosing the preferred level of pri-
vate education to top up. This sort of structure is not limited to the growing num-
ber of charter schools. Investments in early private education can be imagined as
anything from piano lessons to out-of-school tutoring. Data for the US reveals that
the gap in “enrichment expenditures” between poor and rich parents has become
greater over time (Duncan and Murnane 2011, Kornrich and Furstenberg 2013).
When children are old, the household decides whether or not they should go to
college s ∈ {0,1}. Children not going to college work the entire period, whereas
going to college implies spending a share ν of the period in college in case of
dropping out, and a share ν¯ in case of completion, while working the rest of the
period. The earnings of the offspring are shared with parents at the household
level. If a child goes to college, he/she graduates with probability pi(aˆ), thus
dropping out with probability (1−pi(aˆ)). The probability pi of completing college
is increasing in acquired ability and is given by
pi(aˆ) = min{1,ψ0(1+ aˆ)ψ1}, (3)
whereψ0,ψ1 > 0.6 The parameterψ0 is responsible for the level effect of acquired
ability on completion, while the convexity of the function is increasing in ψ1.
College education comes at a tuition cost T per period. The government subsidizes
a share q of the tuition cost T depending on parental earnings according to
q(ho) = max{0,κ0−κ1ho}, (4)
6Light and Strayer (2000) and Chatterjee and Ionescu (2012) provide evidence that graduation
rates are increasing in ability measured by pre-entry test scores.
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where the parameters κ0 and κ1 determine the intercept and the slope of the col-
lege subsidy, respectively. The subsidy is bounded from below by 0, such that no
household has to pay an additional fee, and above by 1, thereby ensuring that no
household receives a subsidy beyond compensation of the actual cost of attending
college.
Acquired ability is multiplied by θ¯ if the offspring completes college and by
θ if he/she drops out (where θ¯ > θ ). Therefore, the earnings differential between
non-college and college graduates observed in society is composed of two compo-
nents, namely the endogenously-acquired prior ability and the exogenous earnings
boost θ¯ . The acquired ability is mapped into human capital of the old child hc by
hc =

aˆ if does not attend college
θ¯ aˆ if completes college
θ aˆ if drops out of college,
(5)
where the college completion probability is given by (3). This functional form sat-
isfies the dynamic complementarity between early and late investments in human
capital discussed by Cunha et al. (2006) and Cunha and Heckman (2008). The
final level of education obtained, denoted as b, can either be high school, college
dropout, or college graduate.
Two things occur when transitioning from an old child to a young parent.
Firstly, individuals experience a shock ζ , commonly referred to as market luck.
The shock accounts for the fact that earnings dispersion within a cohort increases
over the lifecycle (Huggett et al. 2006) and for the finding by Huggett et al. (2011)
that only 61% of the variance in lifetime earnings can be attributed to pre-working
conditions. The shock is multiplicative and is drawn from a truncated normal
distribution ζ ∼ N(1,σ2ζ ). This shock creates no aggregate uncertainty and is
permanent. Secondly, their human capital increases exogenously by the lifecycle
component η0 > 1, such that
hy = η0ζhc. (6)
Young parents are equipped with human capital hy and choose how much to invest
in private early education e. Old parents have human capital ho, which is given by
ho = η1hy, (7)
where η1 > 1 represents the increase in the earnings profile through experience
later in the lifecycle. Earnings are determined by human capital and the competi-
tive wage w, the rate of return to human capital in the market. For simplicity, w is
normalized to unity in what follows.
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3.2.1. Borrowing and saving
Households can accumulate capital k, which yields an exogenous interest r
per period. For reasons of tractability, households are not able to borrow. Given
that college has become more expensive, the importance of the increased uptake
of student loans has been receiving attention (Lochner and Monge-Naranjo 2012,
Abbott et al. 2013, Belley et al. 2014). The fact that one period in the model spans
several years could be interpreted as perfect intertemporal borrowing within a
given period, thereby addressing the lack of borrowing to some extent.
3.3. Households
Households take taxes τ , the public pension p(ho), and redistribution pay-
ments d, as well as public expenditures on early education g and the college edu-
cation subsidy q(ho) for all t as given when maximizing lifetime utility, discounted
by β < 1. The utility of consumption is derived with constant relative risk aversion
as in u(c) = c
1−σ
1−σ , while the utility derived from the child’s final human capital is
valued by φ0h
φ1
c , where φ0 is responsible for the level effect and φ1 determines the
curvature (φ0,φ1 > 0).7
A retired household consumes its savings k, public pension p(ho), and redis-
tribution payments d. The pension a household enjoys is linked to its previous
earnings and is given by
p(ho) = ξho. (8)
Simply speaking, the pension is a fraction ξ of labor income earned as an old
parent. Therefore, the problem of the retired household is mechanic in nature and
can be written as
Vr(k,ho) = u(cr),
subject to
cr = p(ho)+(1+(1− τ)r)k+d,
p(ho) = ξho.
(9)
Let the mass of retired households be µ(xr) and all variables affecting its decisions
be summarized by xr = (k,ho,b).
The state variables of the old household are (k,ho, aˆ). Let z be equal to one
if a child completes college and zero in the case of dropping out. Therefore, the
7Parents value their children’s human capital rather than the expected discounted future utility
flow of the dynasty for computational convenience. While this choice has a minor impact for their
investment decision, as human capital is closely related to expected utility flows, it leads to retired
households mechanically opposing early education in the voting process.
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problem of the old parent household can be written as
Vo(k,ho, aˆ) = max
s∈{0,1}
{V s0o (k,ho, aˆ),Ez[V s1o (k,ho, aˆ,z)]}, (10)
where V s0o (ho, aˆ) is the value function of not sending children to college, and
V s1o (k,ho, aˆ,z) is the value of sending them to college, which depends on the col-
lege completion probability given by (3). The value of not sending children to
college is given by
V s0o (k,ho, aˆ) = max
co,k′≥0
{ (
co
χ )
1−σ
1−σ +φ0h
φ1
c }
subject to
co+ k′ = (1− τ)ho+(1− τ)(hc+ rk)+ k+d, hc = aˆ.
(11)
where χ is the congestion in consumption due to having children at home. The
expected value of sending children to college conditional on completion z is
Ez[V s1o (k,ho, aˆ,z)] = pi(aˆ)V s1o (k,ho, aˆ,1)+(1−pi(aˆ))V s1o (k,ho, aˆ,0),
where
V s1o (k,ho, aˆ,z) = max
co,k′≥0
{ (
co
χ )
1−σ
1−σ +φ0h
φ1
c }
subject to
co+ k′+(1−q(ho))(zν¯+(1− z)ν)T =
(1− τ)ho+(1− (zν¯+(1− z)ν))(1− τ)(hc+ rk)+ k+d,
hc = (zθ¯ +(1− z)θ)aˆ,
(12)
with the probability pi(aˆ) of completing college given by (3) and the college sub-
sidy q(ho) by (4). Let the distribution of old parent households be summarized
by µ(xo), where xo = (k,ho, aˆ,a,b), and let s(xo), ko(xo), and co(xo) be the solu-
tions to (10), and thus the policy functions of the college decision, savings, and
consumption of the old household, respectively.
The state variables of the young household are (hy,a) and their problem is
given by
Vy(hy,a) = max
e,cy,k′≥0
{ (
cy
χ )
1−σ
1−σ +βVo(h
′
o, aˆ
′)}
subject to
cy+ e+ k′ = (1− τ)hy+d,
aˆ′ = δa1−γ(g+ e)γ ,
h′o = η1hy.
(13)
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Let xy = (hy,a,b) and let cy(xy), ky(xy), and e(xy) be the policy functions of con-
sumption, savings, and early private education associated with the young, respec-
tively. The distribution of young parent households is described by µy(xy). The
total mass of households is assumed to be constant and of mass unity per period
of the lifecycle. Therefore, the total mass of individuals is five (since the young
and old parents have children at home).
3.4. Government
The government levies taxes on asset and labor income using a proportional
tax τ . The money the government raises is spent on early and late education, as
well as on lump-sum redistribution and a public pension. More specifically, τg is
used to finance public early education g, while the share τq covers part of tuition
cost T for those going to college. Therefore, government expenditures g on early
education are given by
g = τgY. (14)
The college subsidy depends not only on τq and total production in the econ-
omy, but also on the composition of college students. More specifically, it de-
pends on the mass of students attending college, how long they attend, and what
the earnings of their parents are. The government budget for tertiary education
can be summarized by
T
∫
s(xo)q(ho)ν(aˆ) dµo(xo) = τqY, (15)
where q(ho) is given by (4), ν(aˆ) = pi(aˆ)ν¯ + (1− pi(aˆ))ν is the time spent in
college, and pi(aˆ) is given by (3). Assuming no change in the composition of
students, an increase in κ1 leads to an increase in κ0, which for a poorer house-
hold that send its offspring to college increases the subsidy rate q as long as their
earnings are not too high and satisfy ho < κ0κ1 .
For public pensions, the government balances∫
p(ho) dµr(xr) = τpY, (16)
where p(ho) is given by (8). An increase in τp translates into an increase in ξ , the
fraction of previous earnings one receives during retirement. Finally, τd finances
the total of lump-sum redistributions D, which are uniformly distributed across
households as payment d. The total spent on redistribution D is given by
D = τdY. (17)
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Together, these four tax rates sum up to the proportional tax rate τ , which is
levied on asset and labor income.
3.5. The political decision framework
Households vote on the level τg of early education expenditures determining g.
The share τq of Y dedicated to the college subsidy is held fixed, while households
vote on κ1, the slope of the college subsidy, which endogenously determines κ0,
the intercept.8 The publicly financed share of Y dedicated to social expenditures,
i.e. pension expenditures and redistribution, is held fixed at τs. Households then
vote on how the revenue accruing from τs is split up among pension payments P
and lump-sum redistribution payments D. In practical terms, households vote on
τp(≤ τs), which pins down τd as the residual, i.e. τd = τs− τp.9
The two proportional tax rates τg and τp, and the slope of the college sub-
sidy κ1, are determined jointly through probabilistic voting, which allows for a
weighted average of preferences across households instead of relying on the me-
dian voter.10 Due to the multi-dimensionality of the problem, preferences are
unlikely to be single-peaked, thereby not allowing for the identification of the me-
dian voter.
In probabilistic voting, parties commit to policies before elections take place.
The policy platform is chosen by opportunistic candidates who only care about
being elected. It is assumed that parties differ along an ideological dimension ob-
servable to voters. Candidates know the ideological preference distribution of the
voters, wherefore chosen policies are directed towards those voters that are less
driven by the ideological component. Candidates have an average popularity com-
mon to all voters, which is a random variable and could be subject to a shock such
as a scandal occurring on the day before elections take place. Since the policy
platform is chosen when the outcome is uncertain, parties maximize the expected
share of votes and thus the probability of winning the election. There exists a
8Having households vote on the slope emphasizes the interests of richer versus poorer house-
holds. For a given amount of total funding, poorer households prefer a steeper slope as this in-
creases the intercept, while richer households prefer a flat subsidy schedule.
9This relation between τd and τp is required to reduce the dimensionality of the voting problem.
10Voters do not decide on the actual shape of the tax function, which is linear. Herrington
(2015) and Holter (2015) find that the progressivity of the tax schedule plays an important role.
Additionally, Herrington finds that public expenditures on early education are not always uni-
formly distributed across households as in my model, which could be an outcome of the political
economy, as well. Due to computational complexity, I abstract from these characteristics.
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unique political equilibrium in which both parties propose the same policy by
maximizing a weighted social welfare function, where weights are determined by
the responsiveness of voters to policies, which might vary due to the ideological
component (see Lindbeck and Weibull 1987, Persson and Tabellini 2002). I use
voter turnout by age and level of education as weights in the voting process be-
cause candidates might be best off catering to the segment of population actually
voting, an idea similar in spirit to Hettich and Winer (1984).
The decision voters make does not only depend on tax rates in t, but also on
tax rates in the future (denoted by a prime), which will be decided upon in the
following periods. Therefore, the current policy choices (τg,τp,κ1) depend on
anticipated future policy choices (τ˜ ′g, τ˜ ′p, κ˜ ′1) for three reasons; first, the choices
will affect the level of taxation; second, these shares will affect disposable income
through the residual redistributive payment d; third, the shares will determine
public early education expenditures, college subsidies, and the pension directly.
It is assumed that when voting on the preferred policy in t, they take the antici-
pated values of the future to be the same as those chosen in t and ignore the impact
that their choice will have on future policy choices. In other words, agents assume
that a chosen policy will be in place forever. Since agents are atomistic, this is a
plausible assumption as they do not influence the outcome by themselves. In the
steady state equilibrium, agents have rational expectations. Agents take into ac-
count how policy choices affect aggregate economic decisions and thus consider
how g, d, and the functions q(ho) and p(ho) react now and in the future.
The welfare function W is composed of the weighted discounted values of the
old children (oc), young parents (y), old parents (op), and retired households (r),
and is maximized over the set of tax rates. Assigning ωoc as the weight of the old
children, ωy of the young parents, ωop of the old parents, and ωr of the retired
households in the voting process, which depend on their level of education b, the
problem is
Z(µy(xy),µo(xo),µr(xr)) = argmax
0≤τg≤1−τs,0≤τp≤τs,κ1≥0
W (18)
W =∑
i
∫
ωi(b)Vi(xi)dµi(xi) where i ∈ {oc,y,op,r}, (19)
where Voc(xoc)=Ez,a′,h′y [u(co)+βV
′
y(h
′
y,a
′)], Vop =Vo, and µop(xop)= µoc(xoc)=
µo(xo)
2 . In other words, the distributions of old children and old parents account for
half their respective household mass. However, their values Vj are different as the
expected value of old children depends on the shock realizations in their human
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capital accumulation and the ability transmission to their children, whereas old
parents are concerned about retirement and the human capital accumulation of
their children.
4. Equilibrium
Let total consumption of young, old, and retired households be
Cy =
∫
cy(xy) dµy(xy), Co =
∫
co(xo) dµo(xo), and Cr =
∫
cr(xr) dµr(xr).
DEFINITION 1. Given prices, policies, and tax rates, Vy solves the functional
equations and the requisite budget constraints in (13), Vo solves (10) satisfying
(11) and (12), and Vr solves (9), with cy(xy), co(xo), cr(xr), ky(xy), ko(xo), s(xo),
and e(xy) as associated policy functions.
1. Goods market clearing:
Y = H + rK =Cy+Co+Cr +E +F +g (20)
E =
∫
e(xy) dµy(xy) (21)
F = T
∫
s(xo)(pi(aˆ)ν¯+(1−pi(aˆ))ν) dµo(xo) (22)
2. Labor market clearing:
H =
∫
hydµy(xy)+
∫
hodµo(xo)+
∫
((1− s(xo))+ s(xo)(pi(aˆ)(1− ν¯)θ¯+
+(1−pi(aˆ))(1−ν)θ)aˆ dµo(xo)
(23)
3. Capital market clearing:
K =
∫
ky(ky) dµo(xo)+
∫
ko(xo) dµr(xr) (24)
4. The government balances budgets (14), (15), (16), and (17), which deter-
mine g, q, p, and d.
5. The laws of motionΦmapping from state xy = (hy,a,b) of the young to state
x′o = (k′,h′o, aˆ′,a′,b′) of the old in the following period, such that µ ′o(x′o) =
Φ(µy(xy)), are given by (2) and (7). The laws of motion Ω mapping from
state xo = (k,ho, aˆ,a,b) of the old to state x′y = (h′y,a′) of the young and
x′r =(k′,ho,h′y,a′,b) of the retired in the following period, (µ ′y(x′y),µ ′r(x′r))=
Ω(µo(xo)), are given by (1), (5), and (6).
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6. The rates τg and τp to finance public education expenditures on early edu-
cation g and the public pension p, respectively, as well as κ1, are given by
(18). Moreover, τd , which finances redistribution, and κ0 are determined as
residuals.
A stationary equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium in which policy functions,
as well as subsidies, tax rates, redistribution, and pensions are constant. It is a
fixed point in the voting problem, such that next periods’ tax rates (τ ′g, τ ′p, τ ′d) are
equal to the solution for (τg, τp, τd), and κ ′1=κ1, which are the solutions to (18).
Furthermore, the distributions µy(xy) = µ ′y(x′y), µo(xo) = µ ′o(x′o), and µr(xr) =
µ ′r(x′r) are stationary, hence the distributions can be summarized by µ(x).
5. Model parameterization
In order to analyze the US economy and conduct cross-country experiments,
the model is calibrated to the US around 2010 by matching facts on inequality,
mobility, and public and private education expenditures. The model is governed
by 31 parameters summarized in Table 2. 14 parameters are either chosen from
a priori information or are standard in the literature. The remaining parameters,
of which five parameters emerge from the voting process, are determined in the
calibration by simulated methods of moments with an equally weighted diagonal
matrix, i.e. by minimizing the squared percentage deviation between 12 model
and 14 data moments.
5.1. Independently chosen parameters
One period in the model is equivalent to 16 years. The discount rate is standard
at 0.96 per year, which results in β being set to 0.52. I choose a standard value
in the consumption literature of 1.5 for the intertemporal preference parameter
σ . Following Holter (2015), I set the exogenous yearly interest rate to r = 0.011
based on the 3-month T-bill rates minus inflation from 1947-2008 computed us-
ing data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. College completion requires
four years of attendance, which, given a period length of 16 years, translates into
ν¯ = 0.25. Supported by evidence in Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner (2008), drop-
ping out occurs after two years of college attendance (ν = 0.125). The increases
in earnings through the lifecycle are determined by the earnings ratio of working
males in the given age groups. For η0, I take the ratio between those aged 33 and
48 to those between 22 and 32. For η1, I take the ratio of males aged between 49
and 64 to those between 33 and 48. Using the IPUMS data of 2011, the increases
in earnings over the lifecycle are determined to be η0 = 1.8 and η1 = 1.1.
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5.1.1. Tax parameters
According to the OECD, public social expenditures, i.e. the public pension,
health, and income support, accounted for 19% of US GDP in 2010, which is
the value chosen for τs, the share of Y dedicated to public pensions and lump-sum
redistribution.11 The share of GDP dedicated to college grants is set to τq = 0.002,
which is equivalent to what the federal government spent on pell grants in 2011-
2012 according to the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).12
5.1.2. Voting
Participation in the elections of the President and of Congress is highly corre-
lated with the level of education in the US. Since it is more likely for the higher
educated to vote, politicians might be better off catering to their interests. In
frameworks based on the median voter theorem, this has been incorporated in
models by Benabou (2000) and Ichino et al. (2011) to account for the fact that the
decisive voter might not actually be the median earner. Recent research points out
the effects of skewed voter turnout and a bias in responsiveness towards policy
preferences of the affluent (e.g., Gilens 2012, Schlozman and Brady 2012, Bon-
ica et al. 2013). Additionally, the older an individual, the more likely he/she is
to cast a vote. To account for these potential biases, I use the 2006 voting sup-
plement of the CPS to compute the share of eligible individuals by education and
age group that casted their vote in the 2006 election of Congress. The patterns of
voter turnout by age and education are fairly constant across the three elections
of Congress and the three presidential elections of previous years in the CPS data
(1996-2006), as can be seen in Table 5 in the Appendix. The political science lit-
erature has established a cross-country relationship between inequality and voter
turnout (e.g., Lijphart 1997), but to the best of my knowledge there is no empirical
evidence of this relationship holding or being causal within a country. In addition,
given that no theoretical model has been able to explain patterns of voter turnout
consistently, participation is treated as exogenous.13
The voting weight within the old parent household ωo is split into the sum of
the weights assigned to the parents and the offspring. However, the old offspring
have not taken all educational decisions yet, wherefore individuals in this age
group are not weighted by education, but rather by the level of education of their
parents. Otherwise, education expenditures could alter decisions, which in turn
11See OECD Social Expenditure database (SOCX).
12See https://www.cbo.gov/publication/44448.
13For more discussion about voter turnout, see Section 7.1.
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affects the voting weights of the old offspring. According to the data, on average
27% of those aged 18-32 turn out to vote. Given that their parents’ education is
exogenous at the moment of voting, I use the General Social Survey (Smith et al.,
2015) to compute how parental education affects the likelihood of an individual
aged 18-32 to vote. I find that having parents with at most high school, some
college, and completed college education changes the probability relative to the
average by -6%, +2%, and +9%, respectively. Finally, the weights for those aged
16-32 are multiplied by 7/8 as in practice they would not be allowed to vote for 1/8
of the period. The weights assigned to each age and education level are displayed
in Table 1.
Age High school or less Some college College
18 - 32 .23 .25 .26
33 - 48 .32 .48 .64
49 - 64 .47 .63 .77
65 - 80 .58 .73 .80
Table 1: Voting weights ω
Data source: CPS November voting supplement 2006. Average voter turnout for individuals aged
18-32 is adjusted for parental education using the General Social Survey and by a factor of 7/8 to
reflect the fact that they turn 18 after 1/8 of a model period.
5.2. Calibrated parameters and targets
5.2.1. Education costs and expenditures
In 2009, the share of GDP dedicated to public early education was 3.9%
(OECD 2011) and is targeted by γ , the productivity parameter of early educa-
tion investment.14 The share of household wages parents spend on early private
education serves as a target for the altruism parameters. Using the Consumer
Expenditure Survey of 2010, I compute that parents on average spend 8.9% of
14Of total public expenditures in 2011, 12% was federal, 44% from the state, and 43% locally
provided. By distributing total public education expenditures equally across pupils, I am over-
estimating equality of opportunity in the US as locally-provided public education is correlated
with local income (Herrington 2015). Ideally, public education expenditures in the model would
be chosen on a smaller geographical level, which unfortunately would not be computationally
feasible.
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earnings on private early education for their children.15
In 2010-2011, the average cost of one year of undergraduate full-time stud-
ies at a 4-year institution was $22,092 according to the U.S. National Center for
Education Statistics (NCES).16 Given a GDP per capita of $49,800 in 2011, the
average costs of one year of college rack up to 44% of GDP per capita, which
I target via the tuition cost T . The total expenditures of households on tertiary
education sum up to 1.1% of total GDP according to the OECD (2011). Both
private early education and college expenditures form the targets for the parame-
ters determining the level φ0 and curvature φ1 of the altruism function. However,
enrollment and private expenditures on tertiary education are not independent and
enrollment is already targeted by ψ0. Parents face a trade-off between saving for
retirement, which is affected by the replacement rate, and investing in their chil-
dren, which is affected by altruism. Therefore, I add the replacement rate, which
households vote on, as an additional target for the altruism parameters to improve
identification by having three targets for two parameters.
The share of students receiving federal grants is retrieved from the 2011 Digest
of Education Statistics.17 Of all full-time undergraduate students, 64% received
financial aid through grants in 2007-2008, which pins down κ1, the parameter
determining the slope of the college subsidy with respect to parental earnings.
Parameter κ0 does not require a target as it results as a residual from equation (4).
5.2.2. Education decisions and outcomes
In 2009, 71% of high school graduates enrolled into college according to the
National Science Foundation.18 Given a high school completion rate of 88%
(Heckman and LaFontaine 2010), this results in a college enrollment rate of 62%.
Of all first-time, full-time students who enrolled at a 4-year institution in fall 2004,
58% completed college according to the NCES.19 The enrollment and completion
rates serve as targets for the level and curvature parameters of the probability of
college completion, ψ0 and ψ1.
15I restrict the sample to parents aged 32-48 with two children aged 6-17 and include expendi-
tures on education, health, and other miscellaneous goods and services for children, such as games
and instruments.
16For more information, see the website http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?
id=76.
17See http://nces.ed.gov/programs/digest/d11/tables/dt11_353.asp.
18See http://www.nsf.gov/statistics/seind12/c1/c1s4.htm.
19See http://nces.ed.gov/fastfacts/display.asp?id=40.
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I use the 2011 IPUMS to calculate the college completion and dropout pre-
mium. The ratio of the average earnings of men aged 33 to 48 with at least four
years of college education to those with no college education is 2.53, while the ra-
tio of those with less than four years of college to those with no college education
is 1.32. These are targeted in the model by the college completion and dropout
premium θ¯ and θ , respectively.
5.2.3. Earnings
The empirical estimation of the IEE was pioneered by Solon (1992) and Zim-
merman (1992), who find a persistence of 0.4 in the US.20 This coefficient is tar-
geted by the parameter for the intergenerational transmission of innate ability ρ ,
the coefficient of the autoregressive process. The variance of the random shock in
the transmission of innate ability σa is linked to the variance of log hourly wages
of males. In the US, the variance of log hourly wages of males was 0.47 in 2005
(Heathcote et al. 2010). The Gini coefficient of hourly male wages in the US, my
measure for earnings inequality, was 0.39 in 2005 (Heathcote et al. 2010). This is
targeted by δ , the parameter in charge of the level effect of human capital creation
at the early stage. The relevant moment for the variance of the post-education
earnings shock ζ is the share of the variance in earnings which is not explained by
education and ability when entering the labor market for the first time. This share
is 0.39 according to Huggett et al. (2011).
5.2.4. Retirement
The replacement rate for a median earner in the US averages 41% (OECD
2013b). In the model, the replacement rate ξ is determined through voting on
the tax rate τp. This endogenous outcome serves as an additional target for the
altruism parameters φ0 and φ1 as outlined in Section 5.2.1.
20Concerning other estimates of intergenerational mobility, see Solon (1999) and Corak (2013b)
for surveys of cross-country estimates, and Black and Devereux (2011) for an excellent overview
of recent findings.
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Exogenously chosen
Description Parameter Value Reference
Coefficient of rel. risk aversion σ 1.5 Standard
Discount factor β 0.96 Standard
Consumption eq. scale χ 1.4 OECD modified equivalence scale
Interest rate r 0.011 3-month T-bill (1947-2008)
Time for college completion ν¯ 4 years Standard
Time for college dropout ν 2 years Stinebrickner & Stinebrickner 2008
Lifecycle wage premium η0 1.8 IPUMS 2011
Lifecycle wage premium η1 1.1 IPUMS 2011
Tax spent on social exp. τs 0.19 OECD 2012-2014
Tax spent on college grants τq 0.002 CBO 2011-2012
Voting weights i ∈ {oc,y,op,r} ωi Table 1 CPS voting supplement 2006
Calibrated
Description Parameter Value Target Data
Elasticity wrt early education γ 0.29 Public early education/GDP 0.039
Tuition cost per period T 0.16 Annual tuition costs/GDP per cap. 0.44
Slope college sub. wrt earnings κ1 0.015 Share college students with grant 0.64
Intercept college subsidy κ0 0.54 Determined as resid. in equation (4)
Altruism φ0 1.1 Private early exp./earnings 0.089
Altruism curvature φ1 0.6 Private college expenditure/GDP 0.011
0.41 Replacement rate 0.41
College completion wrt ability ψ0 0.23 Fraction attending college 0.62
College completion wrt ability ψ1 1.02 College completion rate 0.58
College completion premium θ¯ 1.25 Average college premium 2.53
College dropout premium θ 0.88 Average dropout premium 1.32
Level effect of HC prod. func. δ 1.6 Gini before tax 0.39
Persistence ability transmission ρ 0.2 IEE 0.40
STD of noise in ability trans. σa 0.50 Variance of log hourly wages 0.47
STD market luck shock σζ 0.275 Share earnings variance post-educ. 0.39
Table 2: Benchmark model parameters
Notes: The calibrated parameter values are the result of a simulated minimum-distance estimator
with a diagonal weighting matrix.
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6. Benchmark economy
In the following, I discuss the performance of the benchmark model in terms
of replication of the US economy and identification of the jointly calibrated pa-
rameters. Generally speaking, the model performs well at replicating inequality
in terms of the Gini, earnings persistence in terms of the IEE, the replacement
rate, the fraction of individuals going to college, the dropout rate, and the tuition
costs of one year of college relative to GDP per capita, as can be seen in Table 3.
The average college and dropout premium, as well as the share of college students
receiving federal grants, are overestimated. The chosen rates for (τg,τp,κ1) are
(0.041,0.1558,0.015).
Target Data Model
Intergenerational earnings elasticity .40 .38
Gini before tax .39 .37
Variance of log wages .47 .48
Share of earnings variance post-schooling .39 .23
Private early education exp./Mean earnings .089 .103
Annual tuition costs/GDP per capita .44 .41
Private college expenditure/GDP .011 .003
Fraction attending college .62 .56
College completion rate .58 .67
Average college premium 2.53 3.44
Average dropout premium 1.32 1.93
Voting outcome
Public early education exp./GDP .039 .041
Share of college students with grants .64 1
Replacement rate .41 .37
Table 3: Calibration of the US economy
Notes: The model moments are generated using a simulated minimum-distance estimator with a
diagonal weighting matrix.
The share of the variance not explained by ability in the model is 0.23, which
is largely attributable to the idiosyncratic earnings shock experienced when tran-
sitioning into parenthood. Huggett et al. (2011) estimate this share to be 0.39,
whereas Keane and Wolpin (1997) find that exogenous shocks to skills after the
age of 16 account for only 10% of the variation. Therefore, the variation implied
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by the model lies in between these two prominent estimates. Both of the param-
eters governing the “genetic” ability transmission are not directly observed in the
data.21 Therefore, they are linked to two adulthood outcomes. The variance of
log wages is also subject to the idiosyncratic earnings shock, but its main driver
is the variance of the shock experienced in the ability transmission from parents
to children, as σa is responsible for the dispersion of the underlying ability of the
model economy. The model replicates the dispersion of earnings observed in the
data very closely. The correlation in innate ability ρ is 0.2, which is identified
through the intergenerational elasticity of earnings holding public and private ed-
ucation fixed. A large part of the earnings persistence in the model (0.38) arises
due to the underlying structure, i.e. through parental investments.
Holding the amount of public expenditures and the elasticity of returns to in-
vestment fixed, early education expenditures are subject to the amount of altruism
parents feel for their children. However, given that altruism is governed by two
parameters and also affects investments in college, the identification of the pa-
rameters requires at least one additional target related to college investments as
discussed in Section 5.2.1. In the benchmark economy, parents value the human
capital of their children with φ0 = 1.1 and curvature φ1 = 0.6, i.e. at a high level
with decreasing returns. Concerning the targets, the resulting replacement rate
is slightly lower than in the data at 0.37, while parents underinvest privately into
college, partially due to the lower enrollment rate than is observed in the data. At
the same time, parents overinvest slightly into their children at the earlier stage by
sacrificing 10.4% of their earnings compared to 8.9% in the data.
Holding altruism and the level of private early education expenditures fixed,
the amount of public expenditures society votes for should largely be attributable
to the effectiveness of early education. In the benchmark, public early education
investments account for 4.1% of GDP, which is slightly higher than the 3.9%
in the data. This can be attributed to the relatively high elasticity of returns to
early education investments (γ = 0.29), which is comparable to estimates for both
public and private investments. Agostinelli and Wiswall (2016) and Boneva and
Rauh (2016) find the elasticity of cognitive skills with respect to parental time
investments over the course of childhood to average 0.19 and 0.24, respectively.
Both studies estimate a dynamic latent factor model with micro-level panel data
using a comparable specification for skill accumulation as in equation (2). For
21Attempts to estimate the genetic transmission of ability have not yet been able to separate
nature from nurture convincingly.
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public expenditures, Card and Krueger (1992, 1996) estimate an elasticity of about
0.2. The parameter of the early education production function responsible for
the level effect of investments is δ , which takes the value 1.6, and is identified
through the resulting Gini index of earnings. The higher the level of δ , the higher
are incentives to invest in early education, in particular for children expected to
graduate from college in the future. Therefore, δ plays an important role for the
level of inequality a society experiences.
Identifying the college premium parameter is particularly challenging and has
been studied through a range of IV (e.g., Card 1993) and structural estimation
strategies (e.g., Heckman et al. 2006, Carneiro et al. 2011, Heckman et al. 2016).
The observed college premium consists of two components: first, the causal ef-
fect of graduating from college; second, positive selection into college in terms of
ability. The calibration settles on a college premium parameter θ¯ of 1.25. Given
that it is multiplied with acquired ability, the observed average college premium
is 3.44, 36% higher than in the data.22 Heckman et al. (2016) find causal returns
to college graduation in the range of 17.1–26.9% when using structural models or
propensity matching, which suggests that the 25% resulting from the calibration
lies within the plausible range of estimates. The difficulty of matching enrollment
and selection into college can in part be attributed to the missing consumption
value or psychic cost of college in the model, which has been identified as an
important driver of the decision to enroll in college in structural models (e.g.,
Heckman et al. 2006, Carneiro et al. 2011) and using survey data (Belfield et al.
2016). The college dropout parameter θ is 0.88. The fact that the dropout pre-
mium is smaller than unity can be interpreted in terms of a negative signal in the
labour market associated with dropping out or lost time that could have been spent
learning on the job and acquiring experience in the labor market.
The voted college subsidy parameters κ0 and κ1 provide a rather flat subsidy
schedule, which benefits all enrolled students, in contrast to the 64% of students
who benefit in the data. This can be attributed to the fact that both enrollment
and turnout are skewed towards the educated, who would not profit from a steeper
schedule.
22When using the CPS March supplement of 2011 and correcting for top-coded earnings by
fitting a Pareto distribution to the top 20%, the college (dropout) premium increases to 2.74 (1.55).
According to this metric, the college premium in the model is only 25% above the data moment.
Moreover, Armour et al. (2016) show that top incomes are underestimated even when using this
correction method.
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6.1. Voting experiments in the US
In the following, I conduct a range of voting experiments for the US by ad-
justing voting weights.23 For each counterfactual simulation, I compute the steady
state when households vote on (τg,τp,κ1)with the respective voting weights while
adapting their economic decisions accordingly. All non-voted parameters are held
fixed. The results are summarized in Table 6 in which the first and third columns
display the outcomes for IEE and Gini, respectively, while the second and fourth
columns exhibit the relative changes compared to the benchmark economy.
Voter turnout in the US is lower and more skewed towards the educated than
in most OECD countries. Therefore, one possible policy to counter this could be
compulsory voting, as already exists in a number of countries (e.g., Argentina,
Australia, Brazil, Peru). I simulate the policy experiment by imposing mandatory
voting for all. In technical terms, this means that for all b we have ω j(b) = 1 for
j ∈ {y,op,r} and ωoc(b) = 0.875. If everybody were to cast their vote, public ed-
ucation funding of early education would increase from 4.1% to 5.7% of GDP and
financial aid would be directed more at poorer households. As a consequence, the
Gini reduces marginally by 4%, earnings persistence drops by 17%, and aggregate
consumption increases by 9.7%.24 When people with lower education, who are
on average also poorer, are more likely to turn out, the demand for public early
education increases. Now that more children from poorer backgrounds are better
prepared for college, they enroll in college at higher rates, thereby also broadening
support for college subsidies for the poor, which further lowers financial barriers
of entry to college. This boost in enrollment from poorer households feeds back
into the demand for public early education due to the dynamic complementarity.
The combination of these effects is what makes a child’s education, and therefore
earnings, less dependent on parental earnings.
Two policies which have recently received attention in the public debate, are
the extension of the electoral franchise to children as of birth and reducing the
23The voting mechanism, probabilistic voting, is chosen out of pragmatic reasons due to the
complexity and heterogeneity of the overlapping generations model. Interesting voting exten-
sions would include comparing proportional representation, majority voting, or first-past-the-post
voting. However, within the chosen framework, these voting systems cannot be compared in a
straightforward manner and are left for future work.
24This is not to claim that these changes would be immediate, as politicians would naturally
take time to identify preferences of the electorate, which would take several elections. Also, I am
assuming the implementation to be costless, thereby ignoring monitoring costs.
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voting age to 16.25 For both experiments, I multiply the component of ωo(b) that
is attributable to the children by 1 instead of 7/8. To simulate the extension of
electoral franchise to children as of birth, in addition, I double the benchmark
voting weight ωy(b) of young parent households. I assume no changes in terms
of the relative likelihood of turnout.26 As a result of letting parents vote for their
children, inequality reduces to a Gini of 0.34, whereas intergenerational mobil-
ity surges due to increases in public early education expenditures, thus reducing
earnings persistence to 0.29. The effects are much larger than for compulsory vot-
ing as young parents face tighter budget constraints and their large weight in the
political process leads to high early education expenditures. Reducing the legal
voting age to 16 decreases the IEE by 8%, while the effect on pre-tax inequality
is negligible.
Finally, I replace the lump-sum education expenditure by a proportional sub-
sidy for early education, i.e. the government covers a fraction of private expen-
ditures. Abbott and Gallipoli (2017) show analytically that in their setting only
lump-sum education expenditures affect earnings persistence. Under the simu-
lated alternative, public expenditures drop close to zero with the consequence of
an increase in earnings persistence to an IEE of 0.44 and a reduction of aggregate
consumption by more than 2%.
6.2. Exogenous changes in earnings shocks
In order to gain an understanding of whether inequality and mobility are me-
chanically related in the model, I run experiments with exogenous changes to σζ ,
the standard deviation of the earnings shock. When σζ is reduced by 50%, I find
that the Gini drops to 0.32, while the IEE actually increases to 0.41. Conversely,
an increase of 50% in σζ leads to a benign rise in the Gini, while the IEE declines
to 0.26. Hence, the experiment reveals a negative relationship between inequality
and earnings persistence. The intuition behind the result is that when the variance
25The extension of franchise to children is commonly referred to as “Demeny voting”,
named after Paul Demeny, the author of a paper suggesting half a vote for children to counter
low fertility (Demeny 1986). See, for example, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/03/08/
world/americas/08iht-letter08.html?_r=1& or http://milescorak.com/2013/06/
02/should-children-be-given-the-vote-watch-this-tedx-talk/ for recent discus-
sions. The practical implementation discussed would include parents voting for their children.
26This is debatable given that an increased voting weight raises incentives to vote, which thus
could feedback into turnout of the treated group as well. Given that voters are atomistic and turnout
is not modeled in the framework, I refrain from speculating about the magnitude of the possible
increase in turnout among young parents.
27
of the earnings shock decreases (increases), the link between parental investments
and future earnings becomes tighter (looser).27
7. Cross-country differences
As visible in the “Great Gatsby Curve”, inequality and intergenerational mo-
bility are negatively associated across countries. In order to identify potential
drivers of this relationship, I conduct experiments exploiting cross-country differ-
ences in voter turnout.
7.1. Voter turnout
Voter turnout shows strong variations by age and levels of education across
countries. There is a strand of literature attempting to explain cross-country dif-
ferences in voter turnout and specifically low turnout in the US (e.g., Wolfinger
and Rosenstone 1980, Powell Jr 1986, Jackman 1987, Blais 2000, Perea 2002).
General explanations for cross-country differences include legal differences, such
as compulsory voting or voting facilitation through postal or advanced voting, or-
ganizational factors and electoral systems, such as number of parties, party-group
alignment, and proportional representation, and population size. Concerning the
US, there seems to be consensus that the complexity of registration is one rea-
son for low turnout amongst poorer individuals. While the exogeneity of voter
turnout might be debatable, this experiment can be interpreted as relying on the
exogeneity of the aforementioned costs and institutions driving differential turnout
patterns.28 I use this variation to adjust voting weights in the probabilistic voting
process and explain variation in earnings inequality and the IEE. Voter turnout
27In a previous version of the paper, I look at the effect of differences in the exogenous compo-
nent of the college premium and find a positive relation between inequality and earnings persis-
tence. The results suggest that increases in inequality in the top half of the earnings distribution,
rather than increases in inequality per se, are indeed related to increases in earnings persistence.
Note that this result is subject to the model assumption that parents value children’s human capital
rather than future earnings as a change in σζ , ceteris paribus, does not affect investment incentives,
whereas a change in θ¯ does.
28Fujiwara (2015) uses the introduction of electronic voting in Brazil, which reduces invalid
votes by the poor, to show how the exogenous change in voter composition affects pro-poor poli-
cies (which in the studied case manifests itself in the form of increased expenditures on child
health). Similar changes could take place if voting costs that disproportionately affect the poor in
the US, such as early registration or the presentation of a birth certificate, were removed.
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by age group and education is determined using the 2010 European Social Sur-
vey for European countries and the 2010 Canadian Election Study for Canada,
as displayed in Appendix Table 7. I assign these weights to the respective age
groups and education levels in the probabilistic voting mechanism of the bench-
mark model, while leaving all other parameters fixed (except for those determined
through voting).
I find that voter turnout alone explains 31% of the variation in the Gini and
27% of the variation in the IEE.29 The share of the gap between a data moment in
the US dUS and another country dcountry explained by moments mcountry produced
by the model, is defined as (mUS−mcountry)(dUS−dcountry) . The results are summarized in Table 4,
in which I present the data and model moments of the IEE and the gap explained
in the first three columns followed by the same information for the Gini. Figure 3
shows that the experiment replicates the negative relationship between inequality
(x-axis) and non-tertiary public education expenditures (y-axis), while Figure 4
displays the replication of the “Great Gatsby Curve”, i.e. the positive relationship
between inequality (x-axis) and IEE (y-axis) generated by the model (in gray)
compared to the data (in black). While the patterns are replicated nicely, for the
explained gap between the US and other countries, we see mixed results. On
the one hand, the simulated IEE for other countries is always smaller than in the
US, as is the case in the data. On the other hand, for income inequality in some
countries we observe an increase, which in terms of the data, though belonging to
the set of relatively unequal countries, exhibit lower inequality levels than the US.
Canada has a Gini of 0.37 (OECD 2013a) and a relatively low earnings per-
sistence of 0.21 (Corak 2013a). Voter turnout patterns are capable of explaining
13% of the difference in earnings persistence to the US, but inequality is larger
than in the US in the simulation. In the UK, the Gini of individual earnings is
0.383 (OECD 2013a), while the IEE is estimated to be 0.31 (Ja¨ntti et al. 2006).
Voter turnout is increasing in age and education in the UK. However, the bias
is relatively lower than in the US, leading to a very small reduction in earnings
persistence, but a slight increase in inequality.
29These values are the R2 of an OLS regression with the data moments on the LHS and the
model moments plus a constant on the RHS. The US is excluded from this regression as the model
is calibrated to replicate the US.
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Figure 3: Inequality versus public non-tertiary education expenditures (data versus voting experi-
ment)
Data source: Gini from OECD (2013a); education expenditures from OECD (2011).
Notes: The figure compares model moments with country-specific voter turnout by age and ed-
ucation (gray) and data moments (black) of the earnings Gini before taxes and transfers (x-axis)
versus public expenditures (% of GDP) on non-tertiary education (y-axis). The black solid line
represents a linear fit of the data moments, while the gray dashed line represents a linear fit of
model moments. The bottom x-axis and left y-axis refer to the data moments, while the top x-axis
and right y-axis refer to the model moments.
Denmark is among the most equal countries and has the lowest IEE in both
the data and the model. The Gini of individual pre-tax earnings is estimated to be
0.294 (OECD 2013a), while the IEE is 0.15 (Corak 2013a). In Denmark, voter
turnout is relatively high across all age groups and levels of education, resulting
in a simulated Gini of 0.36 and an IEE of 0.32, accounting for 12% and 23% of
the gaps, respectively. Norway has a similarly low level of earnings persistence of
0.17 (Corak 2013a) and a Gini of 0.35 (OECD 2013a). In Norway, voter turnout
explains 29% of the difference in inequality and 25% of the difference in earn-
30
ings persistence. Finland follows the pattern of the other Scandinavian countries
with a pre-tax earnings Gini of 0.31 (OECD 2013a) and an IEE of 0.18 (Corak
2013a). For the case of Finland, however, voter turnout cannot explain the gaps in
inequality and mobility.
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Figure 4: Inequality versus intergenerational earnings persistence (data versus voting experiment)
Data source: See Section 7.1.
Notes: The figure compares model moments with country-specific voter turnout by age and ed-
ucation (gray) and data moments (black) of the earnings Gini before taxes and transfers (x-axis)
versus IEE (y-axis). The black solid line represents a linear fit of the data moments, while the gray
dashed line represents a linear fit of model moments. The bottom x-axis and left y-axis refer to the
data moments, while the top x-axis and right y-axis refer to the model moments.
In Germany, the pre-tax earnings Gini is estimated to be 0.37 (Fuchs-Schu¨ndeln
et al. 2010) and the IEE is 0.32 (Corak 2013a). Both values are in the middle of
the distribution of OECD countries. Voting participation in Germany is biased
towards the older and more educated, but not to such an extreme extent as in the
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US. The publicly chosen education expenditures as well as the Gini and the IEE
are in the middle range of the simulations, not explaining much of the gaps.
Sweden is characterized by a low earnings persistence of 0.27 (Corak 2013a)
and a pre-tax Gini of individual earnings of 0.32 (Domeij and Floden 2010).30
Swedes of all age groups are equally likely to vote, and voter turnout is not biased
towards the highly educated as in the US. The resulting higher levels of chosen
public education funding reduce the IEE by 10% to 0.35 and the Gini to 0.37.
Thereby, voter turnout can explain 43% and 15% of the gaps between Sweden and
the US in earnings persistence and inequality, respectively. These improvements
in inter- and intragenerational equity are accompanied by a nearly 10% increase
in aggregate consumption, thereby not providing evidence on an equity-efficiency
tradeoff. In Sweden, inequality increased over the 90’s, but to a lesser extent than
in the US. Similarly, intergenerational mobility remains high despite increases in
earnings inequality. The model indicates that the political economy, and more
specifically voter participation, might be one reason why the increase in the skill
premium in the 90’s might have had a less harsh effect on inequality and mobility
in Sweden than in the US.
30While Gini values in the introduction are from the OECD in order to maximize sample size,
in my detailed analysis most estimates stem from a special edition of the Review of Economic
Dynamics, in which comparable data and methodology are used for a range of countries. The
patterns are very similar for both sets of estimates.
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Intergenerational elasticity Gini
Country Data Model ∆explained Data Model ∆explained
US .40 .382 .39 .373
Canada .21 .357 .13 .37 .392 -.89
Denmark .15 .324 .23 .294 .362 .12
Finland .18 .379 .01 .313 .401 -.36
Germany .32 .378 .04 .37 .398 -1.19
Norway .17 .325 .25 .35 .362 .29
Sweden .27 .325 .43 .32 .363 .15
UK .31 .378 .04 .383 .402 -4.09
Table 4: Counterfactuals (voter turnout)
Notes: The share of the gap between a data moment in the US dUS and another country
dcountry explained by moments mcountry and mUS produced by the model, is calculated using:
∆= (mUS−mcountry)(dUS−dcountry) .
8. Robustness check using party membership
The educated are more likely to participate in a range of political activities
such as signing petitions, attending meetings, writing to Congress, or contributing
to campaigns (Schlozman and Brady 2012). As a robustness check to the voter
turnout experiment, I instead use variations in political party membership. Party
members spread political propaganda, mobilize voters, and form and shape agen-
das (Huckfeldt and Sprague 1992, Green and Gerber 2008). Ichino et al. (2011)
find that across countries, intergenerational mobility is positively associated with
party membership of the poor relative to the rich. I use the first, third, and fifth
wave of the World Values Survey to determine the membership rate (active as well
as inactive) by age group and level of education in order to assign these shares as
weights, as displayed in Appendix Table 7, in the probabilistic voting process.
In the US, the share of individuals that are active or inactive members of a
political party is highest among the countries examined. However, once again
participation is biased towards the older and more educated. Similarly, the bias
in most other countries is not as pronounced. In Appendix Figure 5, the data mo-
ments (black) are contrasted with the model moments (gray) in terms of inequality
(x-axis) versus intergenerational earnings persistence (y-axis). One can tell that
the “Great Gatsby Curve” is again replicated by the experiment, leaving the results
qualitatively unchanged.
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9. Conclusions
I calibrate a model characterized by dynamic complementarity between early
and college education to the US economy. Households vote on the level and al-
location of education expenditures in non-tertiary and tertiary education, as well
as on a public pension and redistribution. The model performs well at replicating
the US economy across several dimensions including inequality, intergenerational
mobility, the share of GDP dedicated to early education, and the replacement rate
of the public pension.
When taking into account country-specific voter turnout by age and level of
education in the probabilistic voting process, the negative association between in-
equality and public expenditures on education observed in cross-country data is
reconciled. Political participation in the form of voter turnout explains more than
one quarter of the variation in earnings inequality and intergenerational persis-
tence when comparing the US to Canada, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway,
Sweden, and the UK. Assigning voting weights according to party membership
instead of voter turnout leaves the results qualitatively unchanged.
Concerning voting policies in the US, I find that compulsory voting or extend-
ing the electoral franchise to children as of birth by letting their parents vote on
their behalf would reduce the share of earnings transmitted across generations sub-
stantially. However, the effects of these policies on pre-tax inequality are found to
be comparably weak.
The variation of IEE within the US, as exhibited in Chetty et al. (2014), and the
exclusion of pre-primary education in the model provide fruitful areas for future
research.
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10. Appendix
10.1. Tables and figures
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Congress President
Age
High Some
College
High Some
College
school college school college
1998 1996
18-32 .16 .28 .41 .28 .47 .66
33-48 .32 .49 .63 .45 .65 .79
48-64 .47 .66 .73 .59 .76 .86
65-80 .58 .77 .83 .67 .83 .85
2002 2000
18-32 .15 .26 .44 .29 .47 .67
33-48 .33 .50 .64 .47 .65 .79
48-64 .46 .61 .76 .58 .75 .84
65-80 .56 .75 .79 .65 .81 .88
2006 2004
18-32 .17 .29 .46 .35 .58 .72
33-48 .32 .48 .64 .50 .69 .82
48-64 .47 .63 .77 .60 .78 .85
65-80 .58 .73 .80 .66 .83 .86
Table 5: Voting patterns US 1996-2006
Data source: CPS November voting supplement 1996-2006.
Notes: Age at time of election.
Intergenerational elasticity Gini
Country Model % change Model % change
US benchmark .382 .373
Full turnout .319 -.17 .365 -.04
Parents vote for children .288 -.25 .344 -.10
Reduce voting age to 16 .350 -.08 .373 -.02
Proportional educ. subsidy* .445 .16 .419 .10
Table 6: Counterfactuals (US voting policies)
Notes: The percentage change is computed relative to the US benchmark model.
*The voting simulation for the proportional education subsidy exhibits voting cycles and does not
converge, but oscillates around the presented values.
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Voter turnout Party membership
Age High Some College High Some Collegeschool college school college
US 18 - 32 .26 .29 .30 .37 .37 .37
33 - 48 .32 .48 .64 .29 .48 .61
48 - 64 .47 .63 .77 .44 .58 .75
65 - 80 .58 .73 .80 .53 .88 .71
Canada 18 - 32 .78 .78 .78 .14 .14 .14
33 - 48 .80 .95 .90 .10 .25 .19
49 - 64 .88 .94 .96 .15 .19 .30
65 - 80 .95 .99 .97 .17 .13 .16
Denmark 18 - 32 .82 .80 .77
33 - 48 .89 .90 .94
49 - 64 .93 .99 .95
65 - 80 .97 .98 .96
Finland 18 - 32 .63 .82 .84 .08 .08 .08
33 - 48 .66 .76 .88 .10 .14 .11
49 - 64 .75 .90 .92 .10 .22 .27
65 - 80 .88 .92 .91 .19 .12 .17
Germany 18 - 32 .68 .88 .88 .04 .04 .04
33 - 48 .68 .83 .92 .06 .04 .10
49 - 64 .78 .87 .93 .07 .05 .15
65 - 80 .89 .97 .97 .06 .12 .18
Norway 18 - 32 .69 .81 .93 .08 .08 .08
33 - 48 .85 .91 .90 .14 .20 .12
49 - 64 .86 .92 .93 .22 .28 .26
65 - 80 .88 .97 .98 .19 .21 .39
Sweden 18 - 32 .86 .94 .98 .07 .07 .07
33 - 48 .93 .91 .94 .11 .13 .11
49 - 64 .95 .99 .97 .17 .13 .16
65 - 80 .95 1 1 .16 .24 .34
UK 18 - 32 .48 .72 .49 .08 .08 .08
33 - 48 .65 .65 .81 .08 .15 .10
49 - 64 .77 .83 .87 .13 .16 .28
65 - 80 .82 .95 .96 .11 .10 .14
Data source: CPS November voting supplement 2006, European Social Survey 2010, World
Values Survey 1981-2007, Canadian Election Study 2010. Missing values are left blank.
Notes: Age at time of elections. Age group 18-32 is weighted by parental education when
information is available. The displayed voting weight of age group 18-32 is multiplied by 7/8
when fed into the model to reflect fact that they turn 18 after 1/8 of the period.
Table 7: Voting weights based on voter turnout and party membership
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Figure 5: Inequality versus intergenerational earnings persistence (data versus party membership
experiment)
Data source: See Section 7.1.
Notes: The figure compares model moments with country-specific party membership by age and
education (gray) and data moments (black) of the earnings Gini before taxes and transfers (x-axis)
versus IEE (y-axis). The black solid line represents a linear fit of the data moments, whereas the
gray dashed line represents a linear fit of model moments. The bottom x-axis and left y-axis refer
to the data moments, while the top x-axis and right y-axis refer to the model moments.
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